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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-96-68

13 FEB 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Emergency Reinforcement of COMUSMACV (C)

1. ~~(S)~~ Reference is made to JCSM-91-68, dated 12 February 1968, subject as above, which forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to providing COMUSMACV emergency reinforcement.

2. ~~(S)~~ The decision to deploy one brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division and one Marine regimental landing team to South Vietnam generates requirements to provide support for these forces and to sustain their deployments. As recommended in JCSM-91-68, actions now should be taken relative to callup of Reserves, obtaining certain legislation, and instituting necessary procurement action.

3. ~~(TS)~~ A minimum callup of Reserve units to replace deploying forces and to sustain and support forces is justified by the following Service situations:

a. Army. The 82nd Airborne Division represents the only readily deployable Army division in the CONUS-based active strategic reserve. The impending reduction of this division by one-third to meet approved deployments establishes an immediate requirement for its prompt reconstitution which is possible only by the callup of Reserve units. In order to replace the forces deployed from the strategic reserve, to provide support units to meet anticipated requirements in I CTZ and to provide a wider rotation base of requisite ranks and skills, it will be necessary for the Army to call up two infantry brigade forces of the Reserve components. This callup will total approximately 32,000 personnel. These two brigades should attain a combat-ready and deployable status in 12 weeks following callup.

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b. Marine Corps

(1) The Marine Corps cannot sustain additional deployments to Southeast Asia under current personnel policies. Thus, the force authorized for deployment must be replaced with a comparable Reserve unit as soon as possible. The Reserve force required for this purpose will consist of one Marine regiment, reinforcing combat support and combat service support units, and one composite Marine Air Group with one VMA, one VMF, and two medium helicopter squadrons (HMM).

(2) The Reserve force will consist of approximately 12,000 personnel. It will provide the capability to deploy a balanced, self-sustaining air/ground combat force in relief of the lightly structured 27th Marines (Rein) and permit return of the 27th Marine Regiment (Rein) to the training/rotation base in CONUS/Hawaii. This exchange would commence as soon as the Reserve unit becomes combat-ready (approximately 60 days after callup) and must be completed not later than 120 days after deployment of RL7-27.

(3) It is envisioned that the Reserve forces will be redeployed to CONUS without replacement after 13 months in South Vietnam. However, if this does not occur, it will be best to deploy a relief brigade from the 4th Marine Division/Wing Team. Alternately, an adequate rotation base in CONUS to sustain the continued deployment can be created but to do so requires extensions of terms of service and other personnel policy changes.

(4) In addition, it must be recognized that the anticipated proportionate increase in personnel losses will require an increase in the end strength of the active forces to sustain these losses.

c. Navy. Support of the newly authorized deployments will require the callup of two Navy mobile construction battalions (NNCB) totalling 1,700 personnel and 600 individual medical/dental/chaplain Reservists. These callups will provide for an adequate rotation base to maintain the 12 NNCB (11 in-country and one en route) in RVN for direct construction support. The medical/dental/chaplain personnel will provide for bringing recalled Marine units up to strength, sustaining the Navy personnel organic to the deployed RL7, and adding medical staffing required by the increased level of activity in Southeast Asia to forward hospital facilities including Guam.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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d. Air Force. The Air Force plans to support this approved deployment operation without recall of individuals or units. Reserve airlift augmentation needed to supplement the deployment airlift can be accomplished by Reservists on a voluntary basis.

4. (TS) In addition to the Reserve callup essential to the approved deployments, it is both prudent and advisable to call up the following Reserve forces to reach a readiness level that could be responsive to further COMUSMACV force requirements, if the remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division and one more RLT were required. COMUSMACV has indicated the potential need for the foregoing units at an early date.

a. Army. Should the additional deployments be made, it would be necessary for the Army to recall (in addition to the two brigade forces previously discussed) one infantry division force and one infantry brigade force of the Army Reserve components, totalling 58,000 men. These forces will be needed to reconstitute the strategic reserve and to broaden the source of critical ranks and skills to be applied against the increased rotation base requirements. The Reserve units should be recalled at this time to bring them closer to a combat-ready status prior to the probable deployment of the balance of the 82nd Airborne Division. The Reserve division force should attain a combat-capable status in 15 weeks after recall and the brigade force should require 12 weeks.

b. Marine Corps

(1) The most desirable Reserve callup consists of the entire 4th Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), plus other units and selected individual Reserves. This totals about 51,000. Mobilization and subsequent deployment of the Reserve forces should be accomplished incrementally. This callup permits the early and orderly replacement of the 5th Marine Division (-) in South Vietnam and the subsequent redeployment of the 5th Marine Division (-) to CONUS, or, alternatively, the 4th Division/Wing Team can meet the additional requirements.

(2) The provisions of paragraph 3b (3) and (4) above, also apply in this case.

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c. Navy. Support of these additional deployments would require the callup of an additional three NMCB (total of five) totalling 4,150 personnel and an additional 400 (for a total of 1,000) medical/dental/chaplain Reservists. These callups would provide for 14 NMCB in RVN for direct construction support and an adequate rotation base to maintain these deployments. The additional medical/dental/chaplain personnel will provide for bringing recalled Marine units up to strength, sustaining the Navy personnel in the additional deploying RL7, and adding some medical staffing to forward hospital facilities. Recall of an additional 2,800 personnel would be required to augment the logistic operations in Vietnam. The increased requirement for naval gunfire support for the larger deployments would necessitate the activation of two heavy cruisers to fill CINCPAC's requirements for additional shore bombardment capability to maintain two large calibre gun ships on station in the SEA DRAGON area and off RVN. Additionally, 15 destroyers should be activated from the mothball fleet to replace 15 Naval Reserve Training destroyers to be called to active duty. This would fill CINCPAC's requirement for an additional five destroyer on station off Vietnam and provide the rotation base to support them. The recall of 6,000 Naval Reserve personnel would provide the additional manpower and skills base to man these reactivated ships.

d. Air Force. The deployment of the remainder of the 82nd Airborne Division to Southeast Asia will require the support of three tactical fighter squadrons, a tactical reconnaissance squadron, necessary elements of the Tactical Air Control System, one PRIME BEEF unit, and one security squadron. In order to provide support of the deployment and the broadening of the training and rotation base and to retain a minimum acceptable number of combat-ready deployable squadrons in the CONUS, these Air Force organizations will have to be replaced by activation of the following Air Reserve Forces: eight tactical fighter squadrons, five tactical reconnaissance squadrons, one Tactical Control Group, two military airlift groups, and one tactical airlift wing, totalling 22,497 spaces. Activation of these Air National Guard/Reserve units include organizations not currently manned under COMBAT BEEF standards (100 percent).

5. (TS) The reference recommended that legislation be sought now to (1) provide authority to call selected individual Reservists to active duty; (2) extend beyond 30 June 1968 the existing authority to call Reserve units to active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for active duty personnel. One of the most

~~TOP SECRET~~

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pressing needs, common to all Services, is the shortage of critical personnel skills. Statutory authority to extend terms of service and to call up selected individual Reservists would alleviate this deficiency. In the event of deployments to meet possible future MACV requirements, all Services would require legislative authority to call up units and individuals to sustain and replace units deployed. The provisions of this legislation impact on the Services in the following ways:

a. Army

(1) Extension of terms of Service: Provides an immediate impact on readiness worldwide in that critical skill specialists in short supply are retained on active duty. It is estimated that between 30,000 and 40,000 additional trained personnel will be retained in the Army for each month of extension. For example, during the first six-month period of extension of terms of service, the Army would gain in excess of 500 helicopter pilots, of which there is a critical shortage. Other critical skill shortages would be similarly affected.

(2) Selective callup of individual Reservists: The Army Immediate Ready Reserve contains 490,000 personnel, of which more than 90 percent are in grades E-4 and E-5. A selective callup of individual Reservists, coupled with an extension of terms of service, will alleviate virtually all of the Army's current critical skill shortages.

b. Marine Corps

(1) Involuntary extension of enlistments of all enlisted personnel would produce an average of 5,766 enlisted men per month through June. Within this gain, an average of 1,728 experienced ECOs per month would be gained.

(2) Selective recall of individual Reservists would be necessary in order to bring mobilized units up, to provide the essential rank and skills not contained in the organized Reserve. Within the Marine Corps Reserve, but outside of the organized units, there is an invaluable pool of key personnel: noncommissioned officers, officers (particularly pilots), and Marines possessing long lead time "hard skill" Military Occupational Specialties.

c. Navy. In the deploying ships of the Navy, there is a shortfall of 32,500 in officers and the top six enlisted pay grades.

(1) Involuntary extension of Reserve Officers and selected recall of Reserves would fulfill officer manning requirements in one to three months.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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(2) Cancellation of early releases and selective involuntary extensions, recall of Fleet Reserves, deferral of transfers to Fleet Reserve, and recall of Ready Reserves would achieve 100 percent enlisted requirements by rate/rating in one to three months.

d. Air Force. If extension of terms of service were granted, the Air Force could, on a selective basis, hold approximately 20,000 skilled personnel out of a possible 70,000 that would be discharged over a six-month period. Retaining these critical skills would sustain the force at an acceptable level. Should additional forces be deployed to meet possible future MACV requirements, legislation would be necessary in order that active units can be replaced by activation of corresponding Air National Guard units after 30 June 1968.

6. ~~4~~ Funding Implications. Programmed funds do not support these additional deployments to Southeast Asia and the callup of Reserves. Maintenance of equipment has been deferred for many items of equipment, particularly in the Reserves where much of the equipment is older and in a high-mileage category. The deployment of the Army and Marine Corps forces will generate increased overhaul requirements. Additional funds will be required to defray costs of transportation of deploying and called-up units and individuals. Furthermore, additional funds will be required now for procurement of additional materiel, operation and maintenance of facilities, and other costs associated with deployments and force buildup. Thus, concurrent with a decision to deploy additional forces to Southeast Asia and/or callup of the Reserves, a supplemental appropriation will be required.

7. (TS) Based on the foregoing information, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The following Reserve component units be called to active duty immediately:

(1) Two infantry brigade forces.

(2) One Marine regiment, plus the support forces indicated in paragraph 3b(1).

(3) Two NMCBs.

b. The following Reserve component units be brought to a high state of readiness for probable call to active duty on short notice:

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(1) One infantry division force and one infantry brigade force, in addition to the two brigade forces indicated above.

(2) The remainder of the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force.

(3) Three NMCBs, in addition to the two indicated above. Also, de-mothball work and long lead time procurement should begin on two heavy cruisers and 15 destroyers. Fifteen Naval Reserve Training destroyers should be placed on active duty and commence immediate installation of modern communications/electronics equipment.

(4) Eight TFS, five TFS, one TACG, five ARS, one PRIME BEEF unit, and one security squadron.

c. Measures be taken immediately to obtain the legislation to (1) provide authority to call selected individual Reservists to active duty; (2) extend beyond 30 June 1968 the existing authority to call Reserve units to active duty; and (3) extend terms of service for active duty personnel.

d. A supplemental appropriation be requested to cover the unprogrammed cost of the approved and probable future deployments.

8. ~~4~~ Additional problems pertaining to US military capabilities - although critical - are not treated in this paper. An updated assessment of US military posture worldwide and specific recommendations for required improvements will be reported to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the near future.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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